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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
t

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v.

s

ABEL TORRES,

:

Case No. 920522-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Abel Torres appeals from his convictions of
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to
distribute, a second degree felony, and possession of a
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a
third degree felony, both in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(1)(a)(iv) and (l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1992).

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f)
(Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Do the trial court's oral findings and unsigned

minute entry provide this Court with an adequate basis to conduct
meaningful appellate review of the denial of defendant's motion
to suppress evidence?
Whether a trial court's findings of facts and
conclusions of law are adequate to permit appellate review is a
legal question.

LaSal Oil v. Deot. of Environmental Quality, 202

Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 40 (Utah App. Dec. 18, 1992) (citing Adams v.
Bd. of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991)).
2.

Even if the trial court failed to enter all

necessary findings, does the record provide a reasonable basis
for this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress the evidence?
When the trial court has failed to make findings, an
appellate court may still affirm the trial court's decision if
"from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to
support it."

State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 and n.6 (Utah

1991) (citations omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The text of any constitutional provision, statue or
rule determinative of the outcome of this appeal is set forth in
the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 7-8).
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial was
scheduled for June 10, 1992 (R. 48).
Five days before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
evidence seized at the time of his arrest (R. 49). The parties
stipulated that if the court denied the motion to suppress, the
evidentiary hearing testimony would constitute the trial evidence
and could serve as the basis for the court's verdict (R. 89).
2

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court
orally announced its finding that reasonable suspicion supported
the stop and seizure of defendant (R. 163-66)-

(See Addendum A

for transcript of the trial court's oral rulings.)

The court

then reserved its ruling on the validity of defendant's consents
to search and requested the parties to submit memoranda (R. 16669) (Addendum A ) .

Subsequently, the court notified the parties

by unsigned minute entry that defendant's motion to suppress was
denied (R. 71). No written findings of fact or conclusions of
law were entered.
On July 31, 1992, judgments were entered against
defendant for second degree and third degree possession of a
controlled substance with intent to distribute (R. 73-74).1
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of imprisonment
with credit for pretrial time served; the imposition of both
sentences were stayed, defendant was placed on informal probation
and released to I.N.S. for deportation (id*)*2

Defendant timely

appealed (R. 75).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 2, 1992, the Quad County Narcotics Task
Force was involved in undercover narcotics operation and
surveillance in Juab County (R. 96-98).

Two suspects, Gina Keete

1

Defendant represents that he was convicted of one second
degree offense (Brief of Appellant [Br. of App.] at 3). This is
incorrect. Judgments and convictions were entered on both counts
(R. 73-74).
2

The State agrees that defendant's deportation does not
render this appeal moot. (See Br. of App. at 3 n.3.)
3

and Larry Thatcher, had agreed to sell one ounce of cocaine for
$900.00 to a confidential informant who had worked with numerous
police agencies for seven years (R. 97-98, 112, 116-17).
Thatcher agree to take the informant to his Salt Lake City
"source." (R. 98-99).

The informant, Keete and Thatcher left for

Salt Lake in Keete's dark blue, "almost black," 1983 Oldsmobile
(R. 104-06 ). 3
When the suspects reached Salt Lake City, the task
force notified the local police authorities of the purpose of the
surveillance, gave a description of the suspects' vehicle, and
asked the local officers to standby to assist in any arrests (R.
107, 126-28).
The Oldsmobile pulled into an alleyway near 400 South
and 900 East (R. 108-09).

The informant and Keete stayed in the

vehicle while Thatcher entered a "fenced, clutter backyard"; the
police could not observe if he entered the residence (id.. ) .
After a few minutes, Thatcher returned to the vehicle and told
the informant that "he doesn't have it right now . . . he will
have to go get it." (R. 110). The three then went to a nearby
McDonald's (R. 110-11).
Thatcher insisted that he needed the money "fronted"
for the cocaine.

The informant was reluctant because the police

told him not to turn over any money without first receiving the
3

The confidential informant wore a hidden electrical wire
which transmitted the conversations with the suspects; visual
surveillance was also maintained (R. 98-101).
The only time
surveillance was not maintained was for fifteen minutes just prior
to defendant's arrest (R. 131-34).
4

cocaine.

The informant decided to give Thatcher $500.00 and

Keete "fronted" the remaining $400.00 (R. 111-12).

The informant

and Keete stayed at McDonald's and Thatcher drove the Oldsmobile
back to the alleyway (R. 113). Thatcher again walked towards the
residence; shortly afterwards, two people returned to the
Oldsmobile and left (R. 130-31).
The police began following the Oldsmobile but pulled
back when they thought the occupants of the vehicle had detected
the surveillance (R. 131-32).

Based on the previously overheard

conversations between the suspects and the informant, the police
believed that the vehicle was going to the "source" but would be
returning to the alleyway (id.. ).

The police positioned

themselves at locations which the Oldsmobile would need to pass
to return (R. 132). Fifteen minutes later, the Oldsmobile was
spotted at 900 West 400 South (R. 133-34).4
stopped (R. 132-33, 147-48).

The vehicle was

To the surprise of the police,

Thatcher was no longer inside but defendant and his wife were (R.
135).
Defendant only spoke Spanish (R. 135). A Spanishspeaking officer read defendant his Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), rights in Spanish and then
interviewed him (R. 136-37, 150-52).3

Even though the police

* Even though the surveillance had been pulled back, the
officer who stopped the Oldsmobile testified that he knew it was
the same vehicle because of its license plate number (R. 134).
5

The officer stated that he had studied Spanish in high
school, was raised by a mother who primarily spoke Spanish, and is
married to a Hispanic woman whose first language is Spanish (R.
5

had no prior knowledge of defendant's involvement, the officer
told defendant that they had been watching him and knew that he
had just purchased cocaine (R. 137, 154-55).

The officer asked

defendant where the cocaine was and defendant said it was under
the passenger seat (R. 137). The cocaine was seized and
defendant arrested (R. 137-38).

Based on the overheard

McDonald's conversation, the officers also believed that
defendant possessed marijuana (R. 138). Defendant was questioned
and admitted that he had marijuana in his home which backed up to
the alleyway where Thatcher had twice parked (id.• ). Defendant
said he would turn it over to the police; they went to the home
and recovered the marijuana (R. 138-39).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court failed to enter sufficient findings of
fact and conclusions of law to permit meaningful appellate
review.

While the court properly found the stop of the vehicle

and seizure of defendant constitutional, it never explicitly
ruled on the validity of the subsequent warrantless searches of
the vehicle and home.

Instead, after questioning the validity of

the consents to search, the court entered a one line statement
that the motion to suppress was denied.
Further, the record provides no reasonable basis for
this Court to assume that the trial court found the facts
necessary to support affirmance of its decision.

The evidence

surrounding the voluntary and knowing nature of defendant's
149, 152).
6

consents to search is conflicting and turns on credibility
assessments.

The trial court's failure to rule on this critical

issue is compounded by its erroneous view that even if the
consent to search the vehicle was invalid, the search could be
justified by reasonable suspicion.
For these reasons, the State concedes that reversal of
defendant's convictions is warranted and a new trial should be
ordered.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER ADEQUATE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
FAILED TO EXPLICITLY RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF
THE CONSENTS TO SEARCH.
In State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah App.
1990), this Court made clear the necessity for a trial court to
enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law.

For even

when
the decision not to suppress may have been
correct, the critical "issues are for the
trial court to decide and . . . the findings
of fact must reveal how the court resolved
each material issue."
Id. at 771 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987)).

The Utah Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that

if a trial court fails to enter findings of fact, the appellate
court may "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord
with its decision, and . • • affirm the decision if from the
evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it."
State v. Ramirez, 817 P,2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (citations
7

omitted).

But when it would not be reasonable to assume that the

trial court actually made such findings, reversal is mandated.
.Id.* at 787-88 n.6 (clarifying when a harmless error analysis is
applicable).
Here, the trial court properly found the stop and
seizure of defendant constitutionally valid (R. 164-66).

See

State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992).

The

trial court, however, orally questioned the validity of
defendant's consents to search.

At the conclusion of the

evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the court stated:
Now, I will also find that at the time of the
stop the defendant was driving the vehicle
together with a female identified as his wife
and that Officer Lyman attempted to state the
Miranda warning in both English — I don't
think he even tried in English but in
Spanish. I am not convinced that the
defendant understood what was going on and I
am not sure the he understood and perceived
his rights to counsel before making a
statement. I do have some doubt about his
consent to search the car and his home. I am
almost willing to rule however that there was
a reasonable articulable suspicion that there
were narcotics and drugs, that he was part of
the drug transaction and the search of the
car was reasonable under those circumstances.
But if you want to brief it, that's fine.
(R. 164-65).

When counsel continued to argue over the validity

of the consents to search, the court opined that it did not
believe that a consent was necessary to search the vehicle as
that search could be supported by "reasonable suspicion" (R. 16566)•

The court did not make clear if it believed the warrentless

search of the home could be justified absent consent (.id.). The
court repeated that it was prepared to rule that the stop was
8

constitutional but would reserve ruling on the validity of the
searches (R. 165-67).

(The transcript of the court's oral

findings is attached in Addendum A ) .
Subsequently, the parties submitted written memoranda.
In his memorandum, defendant acknowledged that the court had
ruled that the stop was valid but argued that the consents to
search were not "voluntary and knowing" (R. 52-56).

The State

responded that the consents were valid, but in any case, exigent
circumstances justified the warrantless search of the vehicle (R.
57-63).

Without further hearing, the court issued an one line

unsigned minute entry denying the motion to suppress (R. 71). (A
copy of the minute entry is attached in Addendum B).

No

additional findings were entered.
The failure to explicitly rule on the validity of the
consents to search is compounded by the trial court's erroneous
view of the law.

The court expressed that even if the consent to

search the vehicle was invalid, the search would still be
justified by "reasonable suspicion" (R. 165-66).
corrected this misstatement (id..)-

Neither counsel

See State v. Larocco, 794

P.2d 460, 468 (Utah 1990) (in the absence of consent, probable
cause is required to search a vehicle).

Additionally, there is

no record indication that the court considered the State's
alternative argument that exigent circumstances justified the
search.

See State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah App.

1991).
Thus, it is unclear from this record whether the court:

9

(1) reversed its original thinking and found
the consents to search valid, thereby,
upholding the searches of the vehicle and
home;
(2) retained its original thinking that the
consents to search were invalid, but upheld
the search of the vehicle on the erroneous
ground that "reasonable suspicion" supported
the search and that some other basis
supported the search of the home; or
(3) did not consider the consent issue but
found the vehicle search supported by
probable cause and exigent circumstances as
argued by the State in its memorandum, and
applied similar thinking to the search of the
home.
Under these circumstances, the State agrees with
defendant that the trial court failed to enter findings of fact
and conclusions of law on all necessary issues.
POINT II
THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO ASSUME THAT THE
TRIAL COURT FOUND FACTS TO SUPPORT THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCHES, THEREFORE,
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED AND
A NEW TRIAL ORDERED.
For the reasons stated in Point I, the court failed to
explicitly rule on the validity of the consents to search or on
the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances to
otherwise support the warrantless searches.
issues are factual.

Resolution of these

State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah

App. 1992); Morck, 821 P-2d at 1194.
But even when necessary factual findings are omitted,
the appellate court may affirm the lower court decision if it is
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually made such
findings.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6.
10

Here, the record

does not provide a reasonable basis to assume that the trial
court found the necessary facts to support affirmance.
Conflicting evidence existed concerning the voluntary and knowing
nature of defendant's consents to search (R. 135-139, 159-62).
The court's only comment on the issue was its tentative remarks
that it doubted defendant's understanding of English and the
circumstances surrounding the stop and search (R. 164-65).

But

the trial court withheld final ruling and requested briefing
(R. 165-67).

Additionally, the court erroneously stated that

even if the consents were invalid, the search of the vehicle
could be justified by "reasonable suspicion"

(R. 164-65).

The

court expressed no view of whether alternative grounds could
support the warrantless search of the home (id.).

Further, the

issue of exigent circumstances was only raised in the State's
written memorandum (R. 61-62).

Despite these unresolved factual

matters, the court's subsequent minute entry denied defendant's
motion without explanation (R. 71) (Addendum B).
Since the record does not provide a basis to
necessarily assume that the trial court found that defendant had
validity consented to the searches or that the warrantless
searches were otherwise justified, reversal is appropriate.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-89.

11

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions
should be reversed and a new trial ordered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<% day of March,
1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General"^

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to
Ronald S. Fujino, Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, attorney for appellant,
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111, this /(a day of March, 1993.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

1

MR. SKORDAS: No, Your Honor.

2

MS. WELLS: Unless the court feels that it has

3

sufficient information about the case and the law that

4

governs it, and we are prepared to rule now, I am prepared

5

to ask that it be briefed.

6

THE COURT: No problem.

7

That's fine.

8

record, if you would like.

9
10

Do you want to brief it?

I am willing to make some findings on the

MS. WELLS: That would help.
THE COURT:

I suppose Officer Lyman stated it as

11 well as I could, and that is that the facts substantially
12 are as indicated, that there was a contact between officer
13 Ekker and a confidential informant. That that confidential
14

informant contacted two individuals who agreed to purchase

15

for him a quantity of cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I

16

think the amount was. And that based upon that contact

17 that Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his
18 testimony and listened to a conversation between them that
19 would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale of cocaine
20 was going to go down in Salt Lake City. That he followed
21 them in that vehicle to Salt Lake City and he in turn made
22 contact with the Metropolitan—
23

MR. SKORDAS: Metro-Narcotics.

24

THE COURT: Metro-Narcotic8 people and asked for

25

assistance. That there were Utah County officers who

0163

76

joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I
counted, there were seven cars and I will find that there
were seven cars and seven police officers at least followed
the confidential informant and the two suspects to Salt
Lake to a location on the west side of Salt Lake on Fourth
South and about Seventh West; listened again to the
conversation indicating that the person whom he was going
to make contact, supply the narcotics was not then
available, took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store
and that he and the lady went in and remained while the
other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven there
and left.

That Officer Lyman was in contact with Mr. Ekker

and others who were pursuing his vehicle. And that he in
turn engaged in a stop of that vehicle based upon the
information that he had from Officer Ekker and from the
observations that he made.
Now, I will also find that at the time of the
stop the defendant was driving the vehicle together with a
female identified as his wife and that Officer Lyman
attempted to state the Miranda warning in both English —
don't think he even tried in English but in Spanish.

I

I am

not convinced that the defendant understood what was going
on and I am not sure that he understood and perceived his
rights to counsel before making a statement.

I do have

some doubt about his consent to search the car and his

0164

1 home.

I am almost willing to mile however that there was a

2 reasonable articulable suspicion that there were narcotics
3 and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and
4 that the search of the car was reasonable under those
5 circumstances.
6

But if you want to brief it, that's fine.

MS. WELLS:

I think, two things with regard to

7 your findings, I would ask the court to consider including
8 in those verbal findings two things, that once Detective
9 Lyman began the observation of the car, that the —

he lost

10 sight of the car for a period of approximately fifteen
11 minutes and re-encountered the car by positioning himself
12 in what he thought to be a logical return route.
13

TEE COURT:

14

MS. WELLS: The additional fact I think that has

I will make that a finding.

15 been proved is that when the stop was made that the
16 individuals in the car did not match the description of the
17 people who were believed to have —

or supposed to be in

18 the car.
19

THE COURT:

I agree.

I will make that finding.

20 I think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and
21 there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was a
22 part of this entire transaction because of the events and
23 circumstances that had occurred before the stop.
24

MS. WELLS:

I am assuming from what the court

25 said you are prepared to rule today that there was

0165

reasonable articulable suspicion to stop.

I have heard the

court indicate some concern over the subsequent waiver and
consent.

Is that an issue that you are still —
THE COURT:

I don't think you need address that.

I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was
probably no proper waiver and consent for the search of the
house at least.

But I am not sure that you need a waiver

and consent to search the car and the circumstances of that
search. Are you arguing that they —

that the consent was

necessary to search the car?
MS. WELLS: Yes.
THE COURT: Mr. Skordas, do you believe that to
be the fact?
MR. SKORDAS: No.
the consent.

I am concerned a little about

I have seen enough people who speak foreign

languages come to court and play games as far as their
knowledge•
THE COURT:

I agree that can be done very easily.

MR. SKORDAS:

It is my opinion that that's being

done today, based on the officer's testimony.
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that
issue.

If you want to -MR. SKORDAS:

prove that.

I don't know how I am going to

I can't obviously believe that—

THE COURT: You put on everything you have got.

0166
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT

1 Let me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider and
2 think about that issue.
3

MR. SKORDAS:

I think the officer testified that

4 there was some conversations both in English and Spanish.
5 I think it is also clear that under our United States
6 Supreme Court case law that Miranda warnings and the
7 individual words inside the Miranda don't need to be
8 explained and defined other than do you understand each of
9 the rights explained to you.

If the answer is yes, the

10 officer is allowed to proceed.
11

TEE COURT: Let me say I am a little more

12 concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I
13
14

am of the issue of reasonable suspicion.
MS. WELLS:

I would ask the court to find that

15

the officer admitted to deceiving the defendant prior to

16

the first consent to search.

17
18
19

THE COURT:

I will find that he expressed some

facts that were not factually true.
MR. SKORDAS: The deception is though we have

20

been watching you, we know you are dealing drugs and the

21

defendant goes, you got me.

22

but it is not the kind of thing that would be unexpected of

23

a narcotics dealer.

24

warrant or, you know, he said, "We have been watching you.

25

We know you have got drugs."

I guess that's an exception,

If they don't lie or say we have got a

He said, "Yeah, you are

0167

1 right."

I don't see that that is necessarily a deception.

2

I am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you

3

can't search the seat of this car.

4

Officers only see him driving it and with some suspicion

5

that this car is being used to go pick up some cocaine.

6

That's the reasonable suspicion that suspicion is exactly

7

confirmed.

obviously with the consent of the owner.
MR. SKORDAS: That's not true —

10

11

The only difference is —

TEE COURT: He is in possession of the car and

8

9

It is not even his car.

the owner is

over there at McDonald's.
THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the

12
13

car with the consent of the person who has the right to

14

have —

15

the car is you know — what you want me to believe is

16

this—she said, "Take my car and go down and get this

17

stuff."

18

I assume the young lady who's registered owner of

MR. SKORDAS:

I can supply cases to the court if

19

you need to the effect that an onerable situation, even

20

Utah, the officer is allowed to search the area in the

21

immediate vicinity of the driver, passenger of the car.

22

That is for primarily the driver's safety.

23

will testify that coke was found under the seat.

24
25

THE COURT:

The officer

If the officer has a reasonable

articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar with he
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has the right to do a search of the car, doesn't he?

1
2

MR. SKORDAS: Right.

3

THE COURT: With or without consent.

4

MS. WELLS: That goes to the Terry issue and

5

whether the scope exceeds what he is intending to do.

6

Certainly, that goes to the house. You can't forget that

7

the officer said that he believed that the so-called

8

consent was in part based upon the deception that the

9

officer had made to him, so if we should brief that issue,

10

Your Honor, when would you want us to do that?

11

THE COURT: Ten days.

12

If you don't want to respond, you don't have to.

13

MR. SKORDAS:

4

weeks.

I want to.

I will be gone two

This is Kent Morgan's case he asked me to try.
THE COURT: Respond within five days after you

15
16 return.

This man will sit in jail all the time?

17

MS. WELLS: That's the problem.

:8

THE COURT: My inclination is it won't make any

:9 difference.

:o

He will be sitting in jail one way or another.

MS. WELLS:

I don't know, but I believe there's

;i also an immigration hold.

I should have that—we should

have those in in ten days; is that right?
3

THE COURT:

I think so. Does that give you

4 enough time?
MR. SKORDAS: We respond ten days after.

men

1
2
3
4
5

MS. HELLS: Should we set a day to come back
before you?
THE COURT: No. Submit your memorandum.

You

will hear from me.

(recess)

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
STATE OF UTAH
PLAINTIFF
VS
TORRES, ABEL

CASE NUMBER 921900405 FS
DATE 07/21/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

DEFENDANT
TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THIS
COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN TAKEN
UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING
FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED.
CC: BROOKE WELLS
GREG SKORDAS
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